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ABSTRACT
False political information spreads far and fast across social media, with 
negative consequences for society. Individual users play a key role in sharing 
such material, extending its range through the phenomenon of organic 
reach. An online experiment tested the hypotheses that higher trust in the 
source of false information, and lower agreeableness of the person encoun-
tering it, would predict their likelihood of extending its reach. One hundred 
and seventy-two participants saw real examples of disinformation stories 
that had been posted to social media and rated their likelihood of sharing 
and interacting with it in other ways. Neither trust in the source nor agree-
ableness influenced organic reach. However, people lower in conscientious-
ness rated themselves as more likely to extend its reach, as did people who 
believed the stories more likely to be true.
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Introduction
Social media disinformation is a critical problem for society (Buchanan & Benson, 2019). Online 
spaces are awash with false political stories, created with the express intent of deceiving others and 
causing harm. Typical definitions of ‘disinformation’ revolve around false material which is shared 
with harmful intent, e.g., Freelon and Wells (2020). A recent worldwide survey found that the majority 
of people were ‘concerned about what is real and fake on the internet when it comes to news’, rating it 
as the number one internet-related risk (Newman et al., 2020, p. 18).
Once false material is initially posted online – to social network platforms or dedicated websites – it 
can then be spread to huge audiences (‘going viral’). Much of the spread of disinformation can be 
attributed to human action (Vosoughi et al., 2018). People encounter the material on social media, 
then share it to their own networks of contacts, friends and family, increasing its reach. They may also 
engage with it in different ways – ‘liking’ it, commenting on it, or performing other actions that cause 
a social network site’s algorithms to increase the visibility of the material to others. This is described as 
the ‘organic reach’ of a post (Buchanan & Benson, 2019).
The number of people who actively share false material online is relatively low – perhaps lower than 
10% (Guess et al., 2019). However, the vast scale of social networks means that if even a small minority 
of users behave in this way, they can significantly increase the reach of the false information. This in 
turn can lead to troubling outcomes for society: for example, influencing electoral processes or 
damaging public health. Therefore, it is important to consider who shares false information they 
encounter online: what sets them apart from those who do not? Knowing this has both scientific and 
practical values. Understanding the processes and people involved will inform development of 
effective interventions.
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A growing body of work is examining the psychological processes associated with sharing false 
material online. Much of this revolves around mechanisms associated with use of heuristics, cognitive 
ability and digital literacy, demographic factors, and political partisanship (Anthony & Moulding, 
2019; Celliers & Hattingh, 2020; Pennycook et al., 2018; Pennycook & Rand, 2019; Talwar et al., 2019). 
One potential determinant of whether people spread material online is the extent to which they trust 
the source of that information (Deng et al., 2017). For instance, are we more likely to share material 
that we see has come from a reputable news source than an unknown user?
Trust
There is evidence that when we see information that comes from a trusted sharer, we are more likely to 
recommend the source of that news to others (The Media Insight Project, 2017), and that higher levels 
of trust in online information in general are associated with self-reports of sharing ‘fake news’ online 
(Talwar et al., 2019). It has been found that individuals rated themselves as more likely to extend the 
organic reach of a potentially untrue story when they had been asked to share it by a trusted contact (a 
close friend) as opposed to a less trusted acquaintance (Buchanan & Benson, 2019). However, while 
that study found that participants did rate the friend as more trustworthy in a manipulation check, the 
effect found could actually have been due to the closeness of the social relationship with the contact. It 
is known that people are more likely to comply with requests from friends as opposed to strangers 
(e.g., Boster et al., 1995). The manipulation used by Buchanan and Benson (2019) confounded 
trustworthiness with relational intimacy. Therefore, while it seems likely that people will be more 
ready to share disinformation that comes from a source they trust, further experimental examination 
is required to verify this.
Agreeableness
Relatively little research has examined personality traits as determinants of sharing false information. 
Personality is relevant here, because it is known that a number of personality traits are associated with 
aspects of social media behavior (Hall et al., 2013) to the extent that personality can be reliably detected 
from the ‘data footprints’ left in our social media profiles (Azucar et al., 2018). Past work has found 
people lower in trait agreeableness rated themselves as more likely to extend the organic reach of 
a potentially untrue story (Buchanan, 2020; Buchanan & Benson, 2019). A possible explanation is that 
political disinformation items are normally overtly negative about their target, often being outright 
attacks on specific individuals, groups, nations, or issues. Disagreeable people are themselves more 
critical and hostile in their outlook. They are also less concerned about offending others. A more 
agreeable person might hesitate to forward a story to their family and friends if they knew it would be 
received negatively, even though they privately believed it.
A ‘social’ explanation such as this might be more likely than an explanation revolving around 
inability of less agreeable people to identify false information. Findings of previous research on links 
between agreeableness and discernment of false from true news information have been inconsistent. 
Wolverton and Stevens (2019) suggest that individuals lower in agreeableness are better able to 
identify false news headlines.1 Conversely, however, in a larger study with more reliable measures 
that controlled for other variables, Calvillo et al. (2021) reported that higher agreeableness was related 
to better ability to discern true from false headlines. Meanwhile, in a larger study still, Sindermann 
et al. (2021) found no effect of agreeableness on ability to distinguish true and false headlines.
1The findings of Wolverton and Stevens (2019) should be interpreted with caution, given criticisms by Calvillo et al. (2021) and 
Sindermann et al. (2021) on a number of grounds.
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There are also indications that agreeableness may interact with trust (more agreeable people are 
typically more trusting). Effects of agreeableness on general online information sharing may be 
attributable to higher levels of generalized trust (Deng et al., 2017). Therefore, there is a strong 
rationale for considering agreeableness alongside trust.
Aims and hypotheses
This study aims to extend our understanding of how trust in the source of false material, and the 
personality of the individual encountering it, influence likelihood of them extending its organic reach. 
To increase generalizability and ecological validity, it will use multiple examples of genuine disin-
formation stories as stimuli. It will address some of the limitations of previous research (Buchanan & 
Benson, 2019) in that interpersonal social distance between the participant and the person asking them 
to share material will be held constant, but the trustworthiness of the original information source will 
be manipulated. Two specific hypotheses are advanced: 
Hypothesis 1: Organic reach will be higher for information portrayed as originating from a more 
trusted source; and
Hypothesis 2: Participants lower in agreeableness will be more likely to increase the organic reach of 
the disinformation stories.
A number of other variables will be measured (demographic data and personality traits, and the 
extent to which people believed the stories were true), for use as controls and in exploratory analyses. 
No specific hypotheses are advanced concerning these.
Materials and methods
The study adopted an experimental design. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the three 
conditions. In each, they saw three ‘news’ items that had previously been posted on social media. The 
items were presented as if they had been originated by sources of high, medium, or low trustworthi-
ness according to the experimental condition.
The study was conducted online using the Qualtrics online research platform, with paid partici-
pants recruited through the Prolific research panel. Participants were paid UK £1 for their participa-
tion. All were UK citizens, were currently resident in the UK, and used Facebook at least once per 
month. The Prolific participant pool is heavily biased towards younger individuals. Therefore, to 
ensure that older adults were represented in the sample, recruitment was run in two phases: one 
restricted to people aged 60+, and one open to anyone aged 18+ . Ethical approval for the study came 
from the Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee of the host university.
Materials
All materials were presented online, on the Qualtrics platform. Materials, data, and analysis syntax can 
be seen at https://osf.io/dt6vj.
Personality
Personality was measured using a 41-item International Personality Item Pool-derived measure of 
Extraversion, Neuroticism, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. This has 
been validated for use on the internet (Buchanan et al., 2005).
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Disinformation items
Participants each saw the same three ‘news’ items that had previously been posted on social media. 
One was titled ‘REVEALED: UN PLAN TO FLOOD AMERICA WITH 600 MILLION MIGRANTS’; 
one was titled ‘US sends 3,600 tanks against Russia – Massive NATO deployment underway’; and one 
dealt with the 2018 ‘Novichok’ poisonings in Salisbury, UK. All of these had been identified as 
examples of disinformation (Nimmo, 2017; Nimmo et al., 2019; Valverde, 2018). Rather than full 
articles, excerpts (screenshots) were used that had the size and general appearance of what respondents 
might expect to see on social media sites. Three disinformation items were used, and responses 
compiled across all three, to ensure that any findings should not be unique to any specific item. The 
stimuli can be seen at https://osf.io/dt6vj.
Sources
The disinformation items were presented to participants as having been originated by sources high, 
medium, or low in trustworthiness (three of each). In each case, the source was presented as 
a combination of an avatar and a username, as they would normally be encountered in social media.
The high trustworthiness sources were the social media usernames of reputable UK news organiza-
tions. These were ‘BBC News (World)’, ‘The Sunday Times’, and ‘ITV News’.
The medium trustworthiness sources were the usernames of accounts that had been identified 
by Twitter as having been fakes set up by the Russian ‘Internet Research Agency’ (US House of 
Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, n.d.). These resembled US local 
news organizations: ‘Chicago Daily News’, ‘Los Angeles Daily’ and ‘El Paso Top News’.
The low trustworthiness sources were fictitious usernames based on accounts that had shared material 
identified as disinformation. Modified usernames were used to reduce the likelihood of individuals being 
identified in future searches. They were ‘applesofeden_73 #IamSOLDIERX’, ‘wtf!!!’ and ‘Information 
Wars’. The sources used can be seen at https://osf.io/dt6vj.
To establish that the sources really did differ in the extent to which they would be perceived as 
trustworthy by participants, they were compared in a pilot study using participants drawn from the 
same population as the main study. A sample of 20 individuals rated all sources on the item ‘How 
trustworthy is this user as a source of information?’ using a scale from 0 to 10 anchored at ‘Not at all 
trustworthy’ and ‘Very trustworthy’. Mean scores for each of the nine sources used are shown in Table 
1. A repeated measures ANOVA indicated that there were statistically significant differences between 
the three groups of sources (Wilks’ Lambda =.052,  
F(2,18)=162.86, p< .001), with pairwise comparisons indicating that each of the three groups differed 
from both the others in the expected manner.
Organic reach
The key-dependent measure was the participants’ rating of their likelihood to extend the organic reach 
of the set of stimuli. For each stimulus, participants were asked how likely they would be to share it to 
their own public timeline, to ‘like’ it, to comment on it (either positively or negatively), and to react to 
Table 1. Pilot ratings of trustworthiness for sources.
N Min Max Mean SD
ITV News 20 6 10 8.50 1.47
BBC News (World) 20 6 10 8.50 1.57
The Sunday Times 20 6 10 8.40 1.76
Chicago Daily News 20 2 10 6.30 2.18
Los Angeles Daily 20 2 9 6.15 2.06
El Paso Top News 20 0 7 4.50 2.26
Information Wars 20 0 5 1.65 1.31
wtf!!! 20 0 4 0.80 1.11
applesofeden_73 #IamSOLDIERX 20 0 3 0.75 0.97
Ratings came from 20 individuals drawn from same population as eventual sample, rating all sources on ‘How 
trustworthy is this user as a source of information?’ using a 10-point scale.
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it by posting an emoji. For each, they rated their likelihood on a 5-point scale anchored at ‘Not at all 
likely’ and ‘Very likely’. These ratings were summed to create a composite measure of organic reach: 
the overall likelihood of the participant behaving in such a way as to extend the organic reach of all 
three source/story pairings they saw.
Procedure
Participants gave informed consent, then completed demographic items (gender, country of 
residence, education, age, occupational status, Facebook use), and the personality inventory. 
Participants were then randomized to one of the three experimental conditions, where each saw 
the same three stories but attributed to the high, medium, or low trustworthiness sources 
depending on the condition. Within each condition, six different source/story combinations 
were used with participants being randomized to different combinations. For example, in one 
variant, participants saw the ‘Novichok’ story attributed to ITV News, in another they saw it 
attributed to The Sunday Times. This was done to avoid any effects arising from specific source/ 
story combinations.
For each of the three source/story combinations each participant saw, they were told ‘A friend of 
yours recently shared this on Facebook, commenting that they thought it was important and asking all 
their friends to share it:’. They were then asked how likely they would be to share it to their own public 
timeline, to ‘like’ it, to comment on it (either positively or negatively), and to react to it by posting an 
emoji. When they had responded to all three stories (each on a separate page), they were shown all 
three again on the same page and asked to indicate on a 5-point scale how likely they thought it was 
that the message was truthful. For analysis, ratings were summed across all three stimuli to create 
compound measures applying to the whole set of materials rather than single stories. Finally, 
participants reconfirmed consent, then were debriefed.
Data screening and processing
The data were examined for evidence of inauthentic or ineligible responding. Multiple completions by 
the same individual were precluded by Prolific’s screening processes and Qualtrics’ proprietary 
technologies. One participant gave their age as 12 years, one gave their country as Eire. One 18-year 
old claimed to have a master’s degree. Four people indicated they did not ever use Facebook. These 
seven were removed from the sample.
Participants
Target sample size was initially set at 179 participants. This was sufficient to achieve 80% power 
to detect an R2 of .081 (as reported in a comparable analysis by Buchanan & Benson, 2019) in 
a multiple regression with eight predictors (source trustworthiness, the five personality dimen-
sions, age, and gender). Following data screening, 172 participants were included in the final 
sample, reducing power slightly. Demographic characteristics are shown in Table 2. All partici-
pants were UK citizens and residents. While there was considerable heterogeneity, the majority 
were employed women with post-secondary education. Ages ranged from 18 to 82, with 23.8% 
being aged 60 years or older.
Results
Descriptive statistics for key predictor and outcome variables are shown in Table 3. In common with 
other work (Buchanan & Benson, 2019) the four items indexing organic reach (share, like, comment, 
react) were summed to create an overall measure of organic reach with acceptable reliability. Overall, 
participants tended to rate themselves as unlikely to engage with the material in these ways: the score 
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distribution for the compound measure was positively skewed. This is consistent with other research 
finding that the proportion of people likely to share false material online is relatively low (Guess et al., 
2019). One reason for this might be that of course not everyone is interested in politics. The combined 
indices of organic reach and belief that the materials were likely to be true are broken down by 
condition in Table 4.
The hypotheses that personality variables and trustworthiness of the message originator would 
influence organic reach were simultaneously tested using multiple regression. The analysis, summar-
ized in Table 5, indicated that this set of variables explained little variance in the self-reported 
likelihood of extending the reach of the three stimuli, with Adjusted R2 = 0.04. The only variable 
which statistically significantly predicted reach was conscientiousness (β = −.24, t(171) = −2.50, 
p = .013). People lower on conscientiousness reported themselves as more likely to propagate the 
Table 2. Demographic data.
N 172
Sex
Men 43 (25.0%)
Women 128 (74.4%)
Other 1 (0.6%)
Highest level of education
Less than high school 3 (1.7%)
High school/secondary school or equivalent 31 (18.0%)
Some college/University 45 (26.2%)
College/University Graduate 71 (41.3%)
Master’s degree 17 (9.9%)
Doctoral degree 3 (1.7%)
Professional degree (JD, MD) 2 (1.2%)
Occupation
Employed for Wages 91 (52.9%)
Self-employed 26 (15.1%)
Unemployed 8 (4.7%)
Home-maker 6 (3.5%)
Student 13 (7.6%)
Retired 23 (13.4%)
Unable to work 5 (2.9%)
Percentages may not sum exactly to 100% due to rounding errors.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for personality scales, organic reach, likely truthfulness of materials, and age.
Range of scores
Variable N M SD Cronbach’s α Potential Actual Skew Kurtosis
Openness 172 25.36 5.04 .72 10–35 7–35 −0.48 −0.10
Neuroticism 172 22.77 7.01 .87 8–39 8–40 0.04 −0.38
Extraversion 172 26.92 7.23 .89 9–43 9–45 −0.26 −0.50
Conscientiousness 170 36.36 6.78 .87 21–50 10–50 −0.02 −0.75
Agreeableness 172 27.94 4.11 .78 11–35 7–35 −1.19 1.90
Organic Reach 172 17.62 8.29 .86 12–60 12–49 1.93 3.52
Likely Truthfulness 172 6.15 2.80 3–15 3–15 1.02 0.85
Age 172 41.94 16.54 18–82 .50 −.89
Table 4. Organic reach and likely truthfulness scores by trust condition.
Organic Reach Likely Truthfulness
Trust Condition n M SD M SD
Lowest 57 17.53 7.36 5.72 2.54
Middle 59 16.27 6.85 6.12 2.53
Highest 56 19.14 10.22 6.61 3.26
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disinformation messages. No other variables significantly predicted likelihood of expanding organic 
reach. Collinearity statistics (Tolerance and VIF) did not indicate any issues with multicollinearity, 
and the Durbin–Watson statistic (2.13) did not indicate a problem with independence of residuals. 
Given the skewed distribution of the dependent variable, the relationship between conscientiousness 
and reach was checked using a non-parametric Spearman correlation. This was again statistically 
significant (rs = −.28, p < .001, N = 169).
Additional exploratory analyses examined the role of belief in the disinformation stories. Ratings of 
the likelihood that the stories were likely to be truthful were positively correlated with the self-reported 
likelihood of extending the reach of the three stimuli (r = .22, n = 172, p = .004). Repeating the multiple 
regression analysis summarized in Table 5, but using belief in the stories as the outcome variable, 
indicated that only age significantly (negatively) predicted belief in the stories (Table 6): older people 
were less likely to believe them (β  = −.30, t(170) = −3.84, p = <.001). Notably, trustworthiness condition 
did not influence belief (β = .11, t(170) = 1.47, p = .14): there was no evidence that trustworthiness of 
source influenced ratings of how likely the stories were to be true. Collinearity statistics (Tolerance and 
VIF) did not indicate any issues with multicollinearity, and the Durbin–Watson statistic (2.15) did not 
indicate a problem with independence of residuals. The relationship between age and belief was 
checked using a non-parametric Spearman correlation. This was again statistically significant 
(rs = −.36, p < .001, N = 171).
Table 5. Effect of trustworthiness condition, personality, age, and gender on organic reach.
B SE β t p Tolerance VIF
Constant 26.05 8.25 3.16** .002
Trust Condition 0.41 0.77 0.04 0.54 .59 .95 1.05
Openness −0.13 0.12 −0.08 −1.04 .30 .95 1.05
Neuroticism 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.47 .64 .50 2.02
Extraversion 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.95 .34 .72 1.34
Conscientiousness −0.28 0.11 −0.24* −2.50 .013 .62 1.61
Agreeableness 0.19 0.17 0.10 1.13 .26 .78 1.28
Age 0.00 0.04 0.00 −0.06 .96 .85 1.18
Gender −2.79 1.48 −0.15 −1.88 .06 .89 1.13
R2 0.08
Adjusted R2 0.04
F 1.83 .08
Trust condition coded as 1 (lowest) to 3 (highest). Gender coded as 1 (m) or 2 (f). One individual describing gender as ‘other’ was 
excluded from this analysis. 
*p < .05, **p < .05.
Table 6. Effect of trustworthiness condition, personality, age, and gender on rated truthfulness of stories.
B SE β t p Tolerance VIF
Constant 10.05 2.76 3.64*** <.001
Trust Condition 0.38 0.26 0.11 1.47 .14 .95 1.05
Openness −0.07 0.04 −0.13 −1.72 .09 .95 1.05
Neuroticism 0.05 0.04 0.12 1.21 .23 .50 2.02
Extraversion −0.02 0.03 −0.06 −0.72 .47 .72 1.34
Conscientiousness 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.34 .73 .62 1.61
Agreeableness −0.04 0.06 −0.06 −0.67 .50 .78 1.28
Age −0.05 0.01 −0.30 −3.84*** <.001 .85 1.18
Gender −0.38 0.50 −0.06 −0.77 .44 .89 1.13
R2 0.18
Adjusted R2 0.13
F 4.24*** <.001
Trust condition coded as 1 (lowest) to 3 (highest). Gender coded as 1 (m) or 2 (f). One individual describing gender as ‘other’ was 
excluded from this analysis. 
***p < .001.
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Finally, the regression summarized in Table 5 was repeated with perceived truthfulness as an 
additional predictor. Summarized in Table 7, this showed that conscientiousness remained 
a significant predictor of reach (β = −.25, t(170) = −2.64, p = .01), indicating that its influence was 
independent of belief in the stimuli. Belief in the stimuli also significantly predicted reach (β = .24, 
t(170) = 2.96, p = .004). People who rated the stories as more likely to be true also rated themselves as 
more likely to engage with them in ways that would extend organic reach. Collinearity statistics 
(Tolerance and VIF) did not indicate any issues with multicollinearity, and the Durbin–Watson 
statistic (2.01) did not indicate a problem with independence of residuals. The relationship between 
belief and reach was checked using a non-parametric Spearman correlation. This was again statistically 
significant (rs = .22, p = .003, N = 171).
Discussion
Hypothesis 1 predicts that participants seeing disinformation stories portrayed as coming from 
more trustworthy sources would rate themselves as more likely to extend its organic reach in 
various ways. However, the data indicated that a story attributed to a trustworthy news source such 
as the BBC News service was no more likely to be engaged with than one attributed to a username 
such as ‘Information Wars’. Trustworthiness of the source also did not affect participants' ratings of 
how likely the stories were to be true. This runs counter to previous findings (Buchanan & Benson, 
2019) where a more trusted contact (close friend) was more likely to elicit organic reach than a less 
trusted one (virtual stranger). It suggests that those results could actually be attributed to inter-
personal distance rather than trustworthiness, with which it was confounded. This finding is 
consistent with suggestions that how much an individual trusts content is determined less by 
who originally created the news story and more by the person who actually shares it with you 
(The Media Insight Project, 2017). In the current study, the putative person sharing it was described 
as ‘a friend of yours’ in each case. Thus, as argued by The Media Insight Project (2017), one might 
hypothesise that the proximal (person who brought it to our attention; in this case, the ‘friend’ 
described as sharing it with participants) rather than distal (in this case the original publisher) 
sharers of disinformation stories are the important factor in how we react to it. If we trust the 
proximal sharer, or are interpersonally close to them, we may not pay attention to the original 
publisher. However, the framing of the materials here as shared by ‘a friend’ could be interpreted in 
multiple ways (e.g., Facebook contact vs. ‘real’ friend). A way to test this in future research could be 
a two-way experimental design, where original publisher (with different levels of trustworthiness, as 
in the current design) was crossed with immediate proximal sharer (close friend vs. virtual 
stranger).
Table 7. Effect of trustworthiness condition, personality, age, gender, and likely truthfulness on organic reach.
B SE β t p Tolerance VIF
Constant 19.19 8.38 2.29* .02
Trust Condition 0.16 0.75 0.02 0.21 .84 .94 1.07
Openness −0.08 0.12 −0.05 −0.66 .51 .93 1.07
Neuroticism 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.20 .84 .49 2.04
Extraversion 0.11 0.10 0.10 1.14 .26 .72 1.39
Conscientiousness −0.29 0.11 −0.25 −2.64** .009 .62 1.61
Agreeableness 0.21 0.16 0.11 1.31 .19 .78 1.28
Age 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.81 .42 .78 1.29
Gender −2.53 1.45 −0.14 −1.75 .08 .88 1.13
Likely Truthfulness 0.68 0.23 0.24 2.96** .004 .83 1.21
R2 0.13
Adjusted R2 0.08
F 2.68** .01
Trust condition coded as 1 (lowest) to 3 (highest). Gender coded as 1 (m) or 2 (f). One individual describing gender as ‘other’ was 
excluded from this analysis. 
*p< .05, **p< .01.
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Hypothesis 2 predicts that people lower in agreeableness would rate themselves as more likely 
to extend the organic reach of disinformation material. However, there was no effect of agree-
ableness. Again, this is inconsistent with the previous work (Buchanan, 2020; Buchanan & Benson, 
2019).
In exploratory analyses, perceived truthfulness of the disinformation stories proved to be an 
important factor. Participants who rated the messages as more likely to be truthful also rated 
themselves as more likely to extend their organic reach. Intuitively, this result is unsurprising: we 
are more likely to share, or otherwise engage with, stories that we believe in. This principle is long 
established. For example, Knapp (1944) suggested that ‘No rumor will travel far unless there is 
already a predisposition among those who hear it to lend it credence’ (Knapp, 1944, p. 27). It is 
also consistent with findings from other disinformation research (e.g., Buchanan, 2020) that 
people ‘share fake news stories that support their pre-existing beliefs’ (Marwick, 2018, p. 507). 
However, some research also suggests there is at least a partial disconnect between believing and 
sharing false material. There is evidence (e.g., Buchanan, 2020; Buchanan & Kempley, 2021; 
Chadwick et al., in press) that some people report sharing material they knew at the time to be 
untrue. This makes motivations for sharing important to consider in future work considering why 
some people might deliberately amplify false material (e.g., Chadwick et al., in press). Related to 
this, it has been found (Pennycook et al., 2020) that priming people to think about accuracy 
increases their likelihood of sharing true relative to false headlines. However, this would not create 
a methodological problem for the current study, given that people were not asked to rate the 
stories’ likelihood of being true until after they had provided their ratings about likely 
engagement.
Among the personality variables measured, only conscientiousness was associated with 
participants' ratings of their likelihood to engage with the material. More conscientious people 
were less likely to extend its organic reach. This is plausible, as more conscientious individuals 
might be expected to ‘fact check’ what they share more carefully. As more careful individuals, 
they might be less likely to share potentially dubious material. This is in line with evidence 
from Buchanan (2020) that less conscientious people were more likely to report having shared 
false material accidentally in the past. Calvillo et al. (2021) also report that people high in 
conscientiousness are better able to discern false from true news – this is consistent with the 
current finding that those higher in conscientiousness would be less likely to amplify 
falsehoods.
Finally, it is worth noting one effect that was not observed. Influential past work (Guess 
et al., 2019) has flagged the role of older individuals in spreading disinformation, with people 
over 65 showing much higher rates of sharing stories from ‘fake news’ domains. Similarly, 
Brashier and Schacter (2020) argue that older adults are more susceptible to disinformation. 
However, in this study age had no effect on the composite measure of organic reach. Other 
work has argued that older adults may actually be less susceptible: for example, Buchanan 
(2020) reports some evidence of a negative relationship between age and self-reports of sharing 
false material. Calvillo et al. (2020) report that in the context of COVID-19 disinformation, 
older adults were better able to discern true from false headlines. That is consistent with the 
finding in this study that older people rated the stimuli as less likely to be true. Overall, the 
relationship between age and engagement with disinformation appears to be complex. It is 
unlikely to be a linear relationship that can easily be attributed to factors such as digital 
literacy (e.g., Brashier & Schacter, 2020). There may be a mismatch between intentions and 
actual behaviours, given that Brashier and Schacter (2020) report that age is negatively 
associated with self-rated willingness to share false material. Furthermore, age-related variables 
such as political orientation and attitudes or concern about specific health issues are likely to 
play a role.
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Limitations
This study clearly has limitations. It is based on self-reports of the likelihood of engaging in various 
behaviours, rather than actual real-world observations of those behaviours. Work examining whether 
the relationships found here are replicated for actual sharing of material online would be desirable. 
However, there is evidence that self-reports of social media sharing do parallel actual behaviour 
(Mosleh et al., 2020).
The framing of the stimulus material as having been posted by ‘a friend of yours’ could also be seen 
as problematic. As noted above, this could be perceived in multiple ways, and participants’ responses 
could be influenced by whether they considered the person a real friend or just a casual acquaintance. 
This might be especially pertinent when considering polarizing topics such as politics, where people 
might well be concerned about the impressions they make on others. Again, observational behavioural 
research on how people react to such materials in naturalistic settings would be a good way of 
eliminating this potential demand characteristic.
Another issue is that sharing disinformation – or engaging with it in other ways – is a relatively rare 
behaviour, leading to a skewed distribution in the measure of organic reach used here. A number of 
factors might contribute to this. It may be that participants clearly recognised the stories as false, and 
most did not want to say they would engage with them for that reason. It may be that many 
participants were simply not interested in political issues. Or it may simply be the fact that in reality, 
relatively few people share false material online (Guess et al., 2019). All these factors could contribute 
to skewed distributions, restricted range, and floor effects on the variables of interest, with the effect of 
attenuating any associations that might exist between variables. It may be that different research 
strategies (e.g., purposive sampling of individuals known to have shared false material) would be of 
value to counter this issue.
Given that this study was an unsupervised online experiment, it is possible that participants ‘cheated’ – 
for example, by searching for the news stories online, before deciding whether they would share them or 
thought they were true. However, the limited evidence available militates against, rather than supports, 
this suggestion: the typical mean time people spent examining and responding to each of the three stories 
was around 30 seconds. This does not really allow time for ‘fact checking’ during the study.
Most participants had at least some post-secondary education. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) have shown 
that education was positively correlated with ability to judge the veracity of news stories. While education 
levels within this sample did not correlate significantly with either reach (rs = .03, p = .72) or belief (rs = .03, 
p = .74) in the stories, it is possible that scores on the dependent variables were lower, and their relationships 
with personality variables attenuated, relative to a more representative population sample.
Implications and conclusions
In this study, the trustworthiness of their source did not appear to matter as a determinant of whether 
people would engage with false stories. This suggests that interventions intended to teach social media 
users to identify trustworthy and untrustworthy sources would have little impact. This chimes with 
work by Helmus et al. (2020) who found that revealing the source of Russian propaganda materials 
had no effect on participants’ ratings as to whether they would share them.
Rather, the finding that conscientiousness was negatively associated with likelihood to increase 
organic reach lends support to interventions associated with ‘inattention’ accounts of why people 
share false material (e.g., Pennycook et al., 2020). People high in conscientiousness are more likely to 
pay attention to details (e.g., Witt, 2002). The findings for conscientiousness also suggest a hypothesis 
about people who may be more likely to engage with fake news. Among others, Wolverton and Stevens 
(2019) and Buchanan (2020) have argued that it is important to identify personality traits that may 
confer vulnerability to being deceived by false information, in order to inform the development of 
targeted interventions as well as cast light on underlying processes. Conscientiousness may thus be 
a worthwhile focus of future behavioural research.
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In conclusion, it appears that the trustworthiness of the original publisher of a disinformation story 
does not affect willingness to extend its organic reach by sharing or otherwise interacting with it. 
Rather, it may be the relationship between the person seeing the story and the person who forwards it 
to them that affects their likelihood of them engaging with it. On the basis of the current data, people 
low in agreeableness are not more likely to engage with disinformation. However, people low in 
conscientiousness are. While this pattern of results was inconsistent with predictions, it does reinforce 
the notion that individual differences in personality are relevant to our interactions with disinforma-
tion. Finally, it was found that people are more likely to extend the organic reach of disinformation if 
they believe it is true. Given that the stories used as stimuli in this study were patently untrue, this 
suggests that factors influencing belief in false information are likely to be very relevant to the 
likelihood of spreading it. Future research should examine the consistency of material with indivi-
duals’ pre-existing beliefs as a predictor of them sharing false material.
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